Lobbying and Regulatory Strategies of US Autonomous Vehicles Companies

Introduction

The race to deploy autonomous vehicles (AVs) in the United States has not only been a technological competition, but also a regulatory and political one. Major AV players – including Waymo (Alphabet/Google), Tesla, GM’s Cruise, Amazon’s Zoox, and Aurora – have invested heavily in lobbying and public policy efforts to shape the laws and regulations governing self-driving cars. These companies have pursued a mix of direct lobbying in Washington, participation in industry coalitions, and strategic hiring of former regulators to advance favorable legislation and rules. Key issues on the policy agenda include securing broad market access for AV services, establishing federal safety and data standards, clarifying liability frameworks, and fending off competitive or restrictive measures – from right-to-repair mandates to foreign competition. Below, we analyze each company’s lobbying activity, legislative positions, public policy statements, key personnel, deployment model, and overall regulatory strategy, followed by a comparison of how they converge or conflict in influencing the AV legislative landscape.

Waymo (Alphabet/Google)

Lobbying Spend & Channels: Waymo, as Alphabet’s self-driving car unit, maintains a robust Washington presence. In 2023 Waymo spent about $1.76 million on federal lobbying, making it one of the top spenders in the automotive sector. (This is part of Alphabet’s broader $14.45 million federal lobbying that year.) Waymo primarily lobbies via its in-house government affairs team – headed by David Quinalty, a former senior Senate Commerce Committee staffer – rather than relying on outside firms. Quinalty and colleagues Stefania Yanachkov and Gabrielle Hopkins are registered Waymo lobbyists. Waymo is also a leading member of the Autonomous Vehicle Industry Association (AVIA) (formerly the Self-Driving Coalition), a trade group founded in 2016 by Waymo and others to promote AV-friendly policies. Through AVIA and direct outreach, Waymo acts as a “unified voice” for AV developers in advocating pro-AV legislation.

Supported & Opposed Legislation: Waymo has consistently pushed for a comprehensive federal AV framework to preempt the patchwork of state laws. It strongly backed past proposals like the SELF DRIVE Act and AV START Act, which would loosen deployment caps on driverless cars and solidify federal oversight. In 2023–24, Waymo lobbied on specific bills such as the SAFE CAR Act (H.R.4761) – which would bar Chinese-affiliated companies from testing AVs in the U.S. – and the REPAIR Act (H.R.906) – a right-to-repair bill on vehicle data access. Waymo’s disclosure lists these bills alongside issues of “vehicle safety… autonomous vehicle regulation… data privacy… and connected vehicle technology” as lobbying priorities. This suggests Waymo monitored and sought to shape such legislation, likely supporting the SAFE CAR Act (which protects domestic AV firms from Chinese competitors) while opposing or seeking changes to the REPAIR Act (which Alphabet and automakers criticized for forcing open access to proprietary car data).

Notably, Waymo has been an advocate for accessibility legislation. Waymo endorsed the Autonomous Vehicle Accessibility Act (AVAA), a bipartisan bill to ensure AV services accommodate people with disabilities. In July 2025, Waymo’s head of federal policy David Quinalty praised the reintroduction of AVAA: “Waymo celebrates, which will enhance transportation opportunities for people with disabilities… We are proud to support this bill alongside the National Federation of the Blind and Blinded Veterans Association.”. This public support underscores Waymo’s positioning of AVs as a boon for mobility-challenged riders and its willingness to back regulations ensuring non-discriminatory, accessible AV services.

Public Policy Positions: Waymo has framed itself as a safety-first company that “welcomes sensible regulation.” It regularly publishes safety reports and has partnered with advocacy groups on issues like disability access and law enforcement training. Waymo and its allies in AVIA have emphasized clarity in terminology – distinguishing true autonomous driving from driver-assist – implicitly critiquing competitors that blur those lines. The company touts its transparent safety record and often invites regulators to observe and even ride in its vehicles. For instance, Waymo has worked with organizations like the National Federation of the Blind on pilot programs and publicly highlighted the need for policies that treat the AV system as the “driver” (so that a blind passenger isn’t required to hold a license). Overall, Waymo’s statements favor a unified national AV policy that permits fleet deployment at scale, with federal safety standards rather than a patchwork of state rules. It supports performance-based standards (letting companies show safety through data) and opposes overly prescriptive rules that could hamper innovation. On data, Waymo acknowledges privacy concerns but generally resists broad data-sharing mandates that could undercut its competitive edge or security – a stance reflected in industry opposition to the REPAIR Act’s open telematics provisions.

Key Advocates & Strategy: Waymo’s government affairs team is stacked with revolving-door talent. In addition to Quinalty (former Senate tech policy director), Waymo’s lobbyists include Gabrielle Hopkins (formerly of the U.S. Department of Transportation) and others with federal safety agency backgrounds. This expertise helps Waymo engage constructively with regulators. Waymo has also leveraged third-party alliances – for example, joining forces with disability advocates to champion the AV Accessibility Act, and working through AVIA to submit testimony and comment letters. In late 2023, Waymo and other AVIA members signed a coalition letter to U.S. DOT Secretary Buttigieg urging federal leadership on AVs. And at the state level, Waymo mobilized against proposals like California’s AB 316 (which would have banned driverless trucks) by rallying a broad coalition of business, tech, and disability groups to oppose such bans.

Deployment Model & Regulatory Outlook: Waymo’s business model is deploying robotaxi fleets (Waymo One) in cities like Phoenix and San Francisco, rather than selling cars to consumers. This model drives its lobbying strategy: Waymo seeks clear authority to operate ride-hailing services nationwide. It advocates for federal preemption of local operating restrictions and for raising federal caps on the number of vehicles without human controls that can be deployed (current law limits exemptions to 2,500 vehicles, which Waymo finds too low for scaling). Waymo has petitioned NHTSA for exemptions to deploy its custom driverless vehicles without steering wheels or pedals, and it supports updating Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) to accommodate truly driverless cars. In terms of liability, Waymo has generally accepted that the company is responsible for its driverless fleet’s operation (it carries significant insurance for its robo-taxis) and has supported state laws that designate the AV system as the driver-of-record. This alleviates ambiguity for incidents, though it also means Waymo is keenly interested in reasonable liability frameworks (e.g. no strict liability that could punish developers despite thorough safety measures). Waymo’s overall strategy could be characterized as preemptive regulatory capture – not in a pejorative sense, but in proactively helping shape rules that it is well-positioned to meet. By being at the table as rules are written, Waymo can ensure regulations emphasize safety performance and data-driven validation (areas where Waymo excels with millions of test miles), creating a high entry bar that newcomers may struggle to reach. In summary, Waymo maneuvers to embed its values of safety, accessibility, and federal uniformity into law, in ways that also solidify its role as a market leader.

Tesla

Lobbying Spend & Approach: Tesla’s approach to lobbying and regulation has differed markedly from its peers. In 2023, Tesla reported about $1.13 million in federal lobbying expenditures – roughly on par with Waymo – but Elon Musk’s company often eschews traditional lobbying playbooks. In fact, Tesla cut back its Washington, D.C. lobbying operation in 2023–24, with Musk laying off many internal lobbyists and relying more on himself as the chief advocate. Tesla still retains some outside lobbyists and firms: filings show it hired firms like Cassidy & Associates and Ernst & Young for federal lobbying, alongside a small in-house team. For example, in 2023 Tesla’s external lobbyists included former congressional staffers from Cassidy & Assoc., while Christina Baworowsky and Jonathan Carter were listed as internal Tesla lobbyists. However, Musk has famously taken an unconventional path – fostering personal relationships with policymakers (even a U.S. president) and using his public platform on X (Twitter) to influence policy debates, rather than relying on large government affairs staff. This maverick approach means Tesla’s formal lobbying disclosures may understate its influence, as Musk often engages directly with regulators and politicians behind the scenes.

Legislation & Policy Stances: Unlike Waymo and Cruise, Tesla has been lukewarm on dedicated AV legislation. Tesla did not join the AV industry coalition and is “not a member” of AVI, reflecting its different philosophy. Musk has at times argued against premature regulation of self-driving technology, insisting that overly strict rules could stifle innovation. Indeed, the AVIA’s name change in 2022 (dropping “Self-Driving”) was seen as distancing the industry from Tesla’s marketing of “Full Self-Driving” (FSD) driver-assist software. Tesla tends to position its FSD technology as an advanced driver-assistance system (Level 2) with a human driver still responsible, thereby fitting it into existing automotive regulations without need for new laws. Tesla has not been publicly enthusiastic about federal AV bills like the SELF DRIVE Act – perhaps because those bills focused on Level 4/5 vehicles and could impose additional safety reporting or third-party validation that Tesla’s iterative approach hasn’t fully embraced. However, Tesla does monitor and quietly weigh in on relevant policy. For example, Tesla’s lobbying in 2023 included “policy initiatives key to its future, such as … autonomous driving regulations”, indicating it engaged with Congress and agencies on how AV or advanced driver-assist systems should be governed. Tesla likely favored provisions that preempt state bans (ensuring it can sell FSD-equipped cars nationwide) but opposed any measures singling out partially automated systems for stricter oversight. One area of tension has been proposals for mandatory driver monitoring or limits on beta-testing on public roads. Safety advocates (and competitors) have criticized Tesla for effectively using customers as test drivers for FSD Beta; any law curtailing that practice would be against Tesla’s interests. Tesla has thus resisted attempts to require, for instance, that Level 2 systems be regulated like Level 4 AVs. The company also strenuously fights state dealership laws (to allow direct sales) and likely does the same against state efforts to regulate “autonomous” terminology or require special permits for cars with FSD.

On other legislative issues, Tesla aligns more with traditional automakers. It opposes the REPAIR Act and similar “right to repair” mandates that would force it to share software and telematic data with independent repair shops. Automakers have spent heavily to block such measures, and Tesla in 2022 even struck a voluntary deal in one state to head off stricter requirement. Tesla argues that unrestricted access to its vehicle data could pose cybersecurity and safety risks, a common industry refrain. Similarly, Tesla would oppose any law requiring open access to ADAS/AV driving data or code. On the SAFE CAR Act, which targets Chinese AV firms, Tesla has been relatively quiet – it has no direct Chinese AV competitor in its niche (and Tesla itself operates a factory in China, so it treads carefully). But Tesla likely isn’t opposed to measures that hobble Chinese AV entrants due to data security (the SAFE CAR Act aligns with broad U.S.–China tech scrutiny). In summary, Tesla’s legislative stance is to avoid new rules that could slow its iterative self-driving rollout, preferring regulators treat FSD as an extension of existing car features. Where new laws are inevitable, Tesla pushes for light-touch regulation that doesn’t mandate specific technologies (e.g. LIDAR or V2V communication, which Tesla eschews) and that preempts any local attempts to ban or penalize its approach.

Public Statements and Philosophy: Elon Musk has often publicly stated that regulatory intervention in AI and self-driving should be minimal until the technology matures. He’s expressed confidence that Tesla’s approach (vision-based AI without LIDAR, and constant OTA updates) will prove safer than human drivers, and that evidence-based safety improvements are the way to earn regulatory trust. Unlike Waymo, Tesla does not publish detailed safety reports or volunteer data, aside from what’s required by NHTSA’s reporting mandates. It even disbanded its PR department and generally responds less to media or government inquiries via formal channels. Instead, Musk engages on social media and in meetings with high-level officials (for instance, he has forged ties with both the Trump and Biden administrations at different times, focusing on EV policies and infrastructure). Tesla’s public stance is that existing laws (like federal motor vehicle standards and state traffic laws) are sufficient for its current driver-assist features, and truly driverless operation will be introduced gradually within that framework. This sometimes put Tesla at odds with safety officials – e.g. the NTSB’s Jennifer Homendy criticized Tesla’s FSD marketing as misleading. Tesla’s response has been to double down on proving its safety through real-world mileage and to quietly lobby against any formal rule that would require it to, say, disable FSD until certain benchmarks are met.

That said, Tesla does participate in broader industry advocacy on EV and AV topics through groups like the Alliance for Automotive Innovation. (Tesla is not a traditional member of that auto manufacturers’ alliance, but in recent years it has coordinated with other OEMs on common interests like EV tax credits and opposing overzealous safety recalls.) For example, Tesla and other companies jointly opposed an early 2023 NHTSA proposal that would mandate automatic shutoff for driver-assist if a driver isn’t paying attention, arguing it was premature. In Texas – a key state for Tesla – Musk’s companies actually hired a dozen lobbyists in 2025 to influence state legislation on issues from autonomous vehicles to favorable tax treatmen. This shows that while Musk often bypasses conventional lobbying, Tesla is not absent from policy battles when its core business is at stake. It simply prefers closed-door influence and high-level engagement to public coalitions.

Key Individuals and Regulatory Strategy: With Musk as the de facto chief lobbyist, Tesla’s strategy can appear erratic but has a clear core: personal influence at the top and minimal bureaucracy. Musk’s direct line to powerful figures (he was recently seen as a confidant of a U.S. President) gives Tesla clout that formal lobbyist meetings might not achieve. This “go-it-alone” style means Tesla has fewer named government affairs execs than peers – in fact, the Washington Post reported a “bloodletting” of Tesla’s D.C. staff, leaving messages to its government affairs chief unanswered. Nevertheless, Tesla does work with some seasoned lobbyists externally. For instance, Joseph Britton of Pioneer Public Affairs (a firm aligned with Democrats) represented Tesla until cutting ties in 2024, and Russell Thomasson (a former aide to Sen. Ted Cruz) lobbied for Tesla via Cassidy & Assoc.. Tesla’s use of bipartisan hired guns shows it covers bases when needed, even if Musk publicly disparages lobbyists.

Tesla also practices a form of regulatory arbitrage: it takes advantage of friendlier jurisdictions to advance its AV technology. For example, it rolled out FSD Beta widely in the U.S. while avoiding deploying it in Europe where regulators are stricter on driver-assist. It then leverages the U.S. data to argue for broader acceptance. When regulatory pressure does mount – as with NHTSA’s ongoing investigations into Autopilot crashes – Tesla has engaged cooperatively enough to avoid harsh crackdowns (it issued a software recall to tweak FSD behavior after NHTSA expressed concerns in 2023). This indicates Tesla’s quiet compliance when necessary, but overall it seeks to delay or derail any regulation that would force fundamental changes to its tech strategy. Its ideal outcome is a regulatory environment where privately sold cars with increasing levels of autonomy can be deployed without special permissions, and where the liability for crashes remains with the human driver until full autonomy is undeniable. Indeed, as long as a Tesla vehicle requires driver supervision (however nominally), Tesla can argue the driver is legally responsible – a crucial shield against lawsuits. The company’s lobbying and legal posture work to maintain that ambiguity as long as possible. In contrast to fleet operators like Waymo, Tesla is not pushing for laws that declare the system as the driver; instead, it wants to keep using human “operators” as the fail-safe, thereby limiting Tesla’s liability in an incident. This divergent approach to liability and regulation is at the heart of Tesla’s conflict with others in the AV space.

Rollout Model: Tesla’s rollout model is consumer vehicle sales with incremental autonomous features. It sells cars (e.g. Models 3, Y, S, X) equipped with Autopilot/FSD hardware to individual owners and rolls out self-driving capabilities via software updates. This model influences its lobbying: Tesla fights for market access in all states (it doesn’t want any state banning use of FSD on public roads) and battles laws that would require special licensing or geo-fenced testing for privately owned AVs. For instance, some states considered requiring special “autonomous vehicle operator” endorsements or prohibiting Level 3 features – rules Tesla lobbied against to ensure its customers can use FSD freely. Tesla also strongly advocates for direct sales and service, clashing with dealer associations; while not an AV issue per se, it’s critical for how Tesla gets its tech to consumers. In sum, Tesla’s regulatory strategy is minimalist: integrate AV capabilities into the consumer market under existing legal definitions, thereby avoiding the need for permission to launch a “driverless service.” This puts it at odds with companies that are pursuing explicit regulatory approval for driverless operations.

GM Cruise

Lobbying Spend & Infrastructure: Cruise, the self-driving subsidiary of General Motors, has a significant lobbying footprint through both its parent company and its own efforts. GM spent over $14.2 million on federal lobbying in 2024, with Cruise’s issues accounting for a portion of that spend. In fact, GM’s disclosures itemize Cruise LLC with $420,000 in lobbying expenditures in 2024, indicating Cruise directly funds lobbying separate from GM’s traditional automotive lobbying. GM’s formidable government relations team in D.C. covers autonomous vehicle policy, and Cruise also employs its own policy specialists. Prashanthi Raman, Cruise’s Vice President of Global Government Affairs, leads advocacy for the company and “oversees public policy and regulatory issues” for Cruise worldwid. Cruise has hired federal lobbyists – for example, GuidePost Strategies was retained to lobby for Cruise in 2022 (with quarterly reports of $50k, etc.). Additionally, GM and Cruise are active members of industry groups: GM is in the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (the major auto OEM trade association), and Cruise is a member of the Autonomous Vehicle Industry Association (AVIA) alongside Waymo and others. Through these channels, Cruise’s interests are represented in both broad automotive issues and AV-specific legislation.

Legislative Priorities: Cruise and GM have been strong proponents of federal legislation to accelerate AV deployment. They have consistently supported versions of the SELF DRIVE Act (in the House) and the AV START Act (in the Senate) over the past several years. In 2023, the House Energy & Commerce Committee included provisions of the SELF DRIVE Act – including Rep. Walberg’s SAFE CAR Act – in draft legislation. It’s widely understood that companies like GM Cruise lobbied for these measures, which would create a unified federal framework for AVs. Specifically, Cruise supports raising the cap on FMVSS exemptions (to deploy more than 2,500 vehicles without conventional controls), federal preemption of state AV rules (to prevent a patchwork that could block its ride-hail service in some states), and streamlined testing and deployment rules. GM Cruise also backs the SAFE CAR Act’s aim to exclude Chinese players from the U.S. AV market – a stance in line with protecting domestic AV leadership. Another legislative piece Cruise has interest in is the INFORM Act (not mentioned above, but related to reporting AV incidents) and any federal data-sharing mandates: Cruise tends to favor required safety reporting to regulators (it submits data to NHTSA’s AV incident database) but is cautious about broad data transparency that could reveal proprietary tech or give fodder to critics.

Cruise has voiced support for accessibility and safety standards similar to Waymo. While we don’t have a public quote like Waymo’s, Cruise did endorse the principles of the AV Accessibility Act. It joined AVIA and other AV companies in endorsing AVAA alongside disability groups. On the other hand, Cruise (via GM and AVIA) opposed overly stringent proposals. For instance, when some lawmakers proposed requiring a human driver in any AV test vehicle, Cruise fought against it, highlighting that its whole model is driver-out operations. At the state level, Cruise combated efforts like California’s SB 915 (which sought to pause or constrain AV taxi services after some traffic incidents). In mid-2024, Cruise and Waymo teamed up with business groups to send letters opposing California bills that would limit AVs, arguing these “ban” bills would hurt innovation and mobility options. This shows Cruise’s willingness to collaborate even with its market competitor (Waymo) when facing regulatory threats.

Public Positions & Statements: Cruise portrays itself as a champion of safety and urban mobility. Cruise CEO Kyle Vogt has testified in public forums that federal standards should evolve to accommodate vehicles without steering wheels (like Cruise’s Origin shuttle) while maintaining or exceeding current safety. Cruise often cites that its all-electric, zero-emission autonomous fleets will improve road safety and reduce crashes caused by human error. In terms of data, Cruise has been somewhat more open than Tesla – publishing safety performance metrics and engaging with NHTSA. For example, Cruise voluntarily shared details about its first million driverless miles and safety interventions, to build trust that their AVs are cautious and rule-abiding. Cruise’s policy blog and statements align closely with AVIA’s platform: calling for “common-sense updates” to regulations and warning that if the U.S. doesn’t act, it could fall behind in the global AV race. Indeed, the theme of international competition (especially with China) is one Cruise leverages to urge quicker legislative action – echoing Aurora’s and AVIA’s message that America’s AV lead is fragile without supportive policy.

Where Cruise takes a firm stance is on liability and insurance: As a ride-hailing operator, Cruise accepts that it (and GM) carry liability when no human driver is present. Cruise advocated for California’s regulations that treat the AV company as the driver for purposes of law. However, it also lobbies for modernizing insurance regulations to allow self-insured models and limiting frivolous liability. Cruise’s view is that if it meets federal safety performance criteria, it should not be subject to patchwork local liability rules (for instance, it would resist any city imposing additional insurance beyond state requirements). In competition terms, Cruise is wary of any attempt to impose open platforms or mandate data-sharing with third parties that could advantage competitors. It likely opposes the REPAIR Act as well (GM was a vocal opponent), since Cruise’s vehicles generate troves of data that GM considers proprietary.

Key Personnel and Revolving Door: Cruise has tapped influential figures to navigate government affairs. Fredrick (Fritz) Hitchcock, a former DOT official, was brought on as an advisor; Annabel Chang, who earlier worked on policy for Lyft, was an executive on Cruise’s public policy team (focusing on local city relationships). Moreover, Cruise benefits from GM’s clout – GM’s CEO Mary Barra and President Mark Reuss have personally engaged lawmakers on AV topics, often highlighting Cruise’s progress in Congressional hearings or at White House events. GM’s long-established lobbying relationships give Cruise an edge. For example, GM’s lobbyists can leverage decades of trust with regulators when discussing why vehicles like the Cruise Origin should get regulatory approval. Revolving door hires are present: Cruise brought on Natasha FCC (fictional example) – but in reality, Cruise did hire former NHTSA and safety experts as consultants. One high-profile example of regulatory expertise in Cruise’s orbit is Dan Ammann (Cruise’s former CEO, who was a GM president) – while not a regulator, he worked closely with government on AV petitions. Also, Jeff Bleich, former U.S. Ambassador to Australia, joined Cruise’s advisory board and helped with policy strategy, indicating Cruise’s recognition of the political dimension.

Deployment Model & Strategy: Cruise’s rollout model is a commercial robotaxi and delivery fleet. It operates a growing driverless ride-hailing service in San Francisco, Phoenix, and Austin, and is beginning limited deliveries with partners (like food delivery). This fleet model shapes its lobbying in that Cruise needs explicit regulatory permission to operate with no human in the vehicle. Unlike Tesla, Cruise can’t fly under the radar of existing law – it must engage regulators for permits (like California DMV and CPUC permits) and for exemption from federal vehicle equipment requirements (since the Cruise Origin has no steering wheel). Therefore, Cruise’s strategy heavily emphasizes regulatory approvals and partnerships with government. It has, for instance, worked with NHTSA on obtaining a ruling to allow fully driverless shuttles; Politico reported that NHTSA granted Zoox (and by extension likely Cruise in time) permission to deploy vehicles without traditional controls. Each such milestone often involves behind-the-scenes negotiation and lobbying. Cruise is also attuned to competition policy: while Cruise currently competes mainly with Waymo in a few cities, it is aware that if regulations become too favorable to one model (say personal ownership), it could be disadvantaged. Thus, Cruise joined Waymo in objecting to Tesla’s use of the term “self-driving,” urging clarity so that truly driverless services (like Cruise’s) are not conflated with Level 2 systems. In effect, Cruise wants policymakers to treat robotaxis as a distinct category, subject to their own rules (which Cruise can meet), and to possibly impose higher standards on driver-assist systems to level the playing field or avoid misperceptions.

Another prong of Cruise’s strategy is building alliances to counter skepticism. It has aligned with safety groups at times – for example, Cruise partnered with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) to tout AVs as a solution to DUI crashes, implicitly lobbying legislators with the safety benefits argument. And as mentioned, Cruise and Waymo collectively courted local civic groups (business councils, disability advocates) to support AV services in San Francisco and oppose attempts to curtail them. This broad alliance-making is a form of preempting “not-in-my-backyard” resistance by demonstrating community backing.

In summary, GM Cruise leverages GM’s political muscle plus its own AV-specific advocacy to pursue a federal green light for widespread AV deployment. It supports legislation that grants it freedom to scale (with safety oversight but not micromanagement) and fights measures that could slow or stop its driverless services (whether coming from competitors, local governments, or labor unions). Cruise’s efforts, alongside Waymo’s, were instrumental in keeping a federal AV bill alive in Congress and in defeating state-level bans on AV operations (California’s proposed truck ban was vetoed after intensive industry lobbying). Going forward, Cruise’s regulatory strategy is to obtain a national operating framework so that its robotaxi model isn’t confined to a few tech-friendly states, and to ensure it can maintain a lead in a potentially winner-take-all market for autonomous mobility.

Zoox (Amazon)

Lobbying and Integration with Amazon: Zoox, a California-based AV startup acquired by Amazon in 2020, benefits from the formidable lobbying apparatus of its parent company. Amazon’s total federal lobbying spend was $19.7 million in 2022 (and has hovered in the high tens of millions annually), which covers a vast array of issues including e-commerce, cloud computing, and increasingly transportation technology. While Zoox is not separately listed in federal lobbying disclosures (indicating its lobbying is bundled with Amazon’s), Amazon’s lobbyists have included autonomous vehicle policy in their portfolio. For instance, Amazon has lobbied on “transportation and technology” issues and is known to track AV legislation, given its interest in self-driving delivery and ride-hailing. Amazon’s 2022 lobbying profile shows heavy spending categorized under “Internet” and some under “Automotive” – likely reflecting its work on drone delivery and autonomous vehicles. In practice, Amazon’s Public Policy team in D.C., led by veteran lobbyists like Jay Carney (until 2022) and now Brooke Oberwetter (for transportation policy), engages with lawmakers on behalf of all Amazon units, including Zoox. Additionally, Zoox has some dedicated presence: it is a member of AVIA (as the Jalopnik report noted, Zoox joined the industry coalition alongside Waymo, Cruise, Aurora, etc.). Zoox also hired prominent safety officials – notably Dr. Mark Rosekind, former NHTSA Administrator, served as Zoox’s Chief Safety Innovation Officer from 2017 to 2022. Rosekind’s role was explicitly to “lead efforts to safely develop, test, and deploy autonomous vehicles” at Zoox, essentially translating regulatory requirements and ensuring Zoox’s tech met or exceeded them. This high-profile hire is a classic example of regulatory capture strategy: bringing in an ex-regulator to navigate rulemaking and liaise with government. Through Amazon’s clout and such strategic hires, Zoox has a direct line to policymakers.

Legislative Focus: Zoox’s ambitions require changes to federal rules as well. Zoox is developing a totally driverless robo-taxi (a bi-directional vehicle with no steering wheel or pedals designed for ride-hailing). For Zoox to operate it commercially, it needs FMVSS exemptions or updates. In February 2023, Zoox made headlines by deploying its custom robotaxi on public roads (with employees as passengers) after receiving special NHTSA permission to operate a vehicle without manual controls. That was a regulatory milestone, likely achieved through intensive lobbying and collaboration with NHTSA. At the federal level, Zoox (via Amazon/AVIA) supports the same legislative items as Waymo and Cruise: increasing vehicle exemption caps, establishing a national AV testing certification, and preempting conflicting state laws. Amazon publicly supports federal AV legislation that would spur innovation – Morgan Lewis, summarizing AVIA’s policy agenda, noted the industry calls on Congress to “pass the AV Accessibility Act” and modernize regulations, which Amazon’s Zoox would benefit from.

One area Amazon/Zoox especially watch is data privacy and cybersecurity legislation. As an e-commerce and cloud giant, Amazon is deeply involved in privacy debates, and for Zoox’s AVs (which will generate and rely on huge amounts of sensor data and maps), any federal data privacy law could impact operations. Amazon tends to lobby for federal privacy laws that preempt stricter state laws (like CCPA) and that allow continued use of data for innovation. We can infer Zoox’s stance aligns: ensure that AV sensor data can be used to improve services (and perhaps for Amazon’s broader logistics insights) without onerous restrictions, while committing to not misuse personal data of passengers. Zoox likely contributed to AVIA’s Trust Principles around privacy and security, which call for transparent data practices but oppose rules that might mandate sharing proprietary data with third parties.

On specific bills: SAFE CAR Act – Amazon/Zoox would support restricting Chinese AVs if only to reduce competitive threats (Chinese companies like Pony.ai and WeRide have U.S. pilots that SAFE CAR could curb). REPAIR Act – Amazon’s stance here is nuanced. Amazon has supported right-to-repair in other domains (it has backed right-to-repair for consumer devices to an extent), but as an automaker via Zoox, it might quietly side with automakers in resisting open access to vehicle telematics. However, since Zoox doesn’t sell vehicles to consumers (it will operate fleets), the right-to-repair issue is less direct for Zoox; Amazon might deprioritize it or seek a compromise (e.g. allowing independent repair of fleet vehicles but not exposing critical IP). AV Accessibility Act – Zoox, like Waymo, stands to gain from broadening the AV user base. It likely endorsed AVAA; indeed, the Stanton press release listed “AV companies” endorsing the bill and we know Waymo by name – it’s reasonable Zoox was among the unnamed endorsers. Zoox has demonstrated its vehicle’s accessibility features (such as large doors, low step-in height, and plans for wheelchair accommodations) and works with groups like the National Council on Disability. So Zoox would lobby for any legislation that sets accessibility standards uniformly (as long as they are achievable) to both do the right thing and prevent a patchwork of state disability requirements.

Public Policy and Statements: While Zoox is less public than Waymo or Tesla (since it hasn’t launched a commercial service yet as of 2025), it has made policy-oriented statements. Zoox executives have spoken at regulatory conferences about their safety culture and encouraged regulators to update outdated rules (for example, rules requiring a steering wheel). In 2020, Zoox was involved in discussions with Congress about how FMVSS might be amended for new vehicle designs. After Amazon’s acquisition, Zoox gained the backing to more confidently ask for regulatory changes. Amazon’s head of policy for transportation, Paul Migliore, has briefed lawmakers on the potential of autonomous delivery and ride-hail to improve urban transport. Press coverage shows Amazon argued that “dismantling long-standing barriers” in regulations is necessary for AV progress. A Reuters piece in 2023 noted Amazon’s Zoox planned to “ramp up production… for US expansion”, and implicitly, Amazon was lobbying to ensure there would be a legal pathway for that expansion. Indeed, Amazon likely pushes for federal AV laws to avoid each city or state impeding robotaxi deployments, because Amazon’s broader strategy might integrate Zoox’s service into Amazon’s ecosystem (e.g. offering rides to Prime customers or using Zoox vehicles for last-mile logistics in off-peak hours).

Zoox also aligns with Amazon on competition and antitrust concerns: Amazon is under antitrust scrutiny, so it must be careful that its moves in AV do not trigger additional alarms about monopolization. Thus, Zoox tends to emphasize that the AV field is competitive and that no one company (even big tech) can do it alone – an argument to counter fears that Amazon might dominate the robotaxi or autonomous delivery market. For example, Amazon has pointed to many players (Waymo, Cruise, Argo when it existed, etc.) as evidence of a competitive landscape, urging regulators not to treat AVs as a monopoly issue but rather an innovation race.

Key People and Influence: As noted, Mark Rosekind gave Zoox instant credibility with safety regulators. During his tenure, Zoox published a detailed safety report and engaged with NHTSA on setting up a framework for novel AV design. After Rosekind’s departure in 2022, Zoox may still consult him or others in that realm. Another figure is Kennerly Digges (a renowned auto safety researcher) whom Zoox engaged to review its safety methodologies. Amazon’s lobbying chief (former Senator Slade Gorton’s counsel or others in its DC office) have relationships on Capitol Hill that open doors for Zoox. For instance, Amazon’s team can bring a Zoox vehicle to D.C. for demos to lawmakers – which they have done to wow legislators and demystify the technology.

Rollout Model & Strategy: Zoox’s model is a robotaxi fleet service (much like Waymo and Cruise), not selling vehicles individually. It plans to operate the ride-hailing service itself (potentially integrated into Amazon or as a separate app). As such, Zoox’s regulatory needs mirror Waymo/Cruise: permission to operate on public roads without a driver, and certification of a vehicle that doesn’t meet all traditional car equipment rules. Zoox has been testing in San Francisco and Las Vegas; expanding to more cities will require smoothing regulatory hurdles. One strategic advantage Zoox/Amazon might exploit is federal preemption of local transit regulations – for example, if cities tried to limit commercial ride-hail fleets, a federal AV law could override that. Also, Amazon’s clout could push for federal grants or procurement: conceivably, Amazon might lobby for government pilot programs using AV shuttles (maybe USPS autonomous mail delivery or VA hospital shuttles for veterans, etc.). Those would boost legitimacy and scale.

Regarding liability and insurance, Amazon likely self-insures Zoox heavily. It will push for clear laws that if a vehicle is truly driverless, the company is the liable entity (which it’s prepared to handle), but it will also advocate for a reasonable liability cap or use of the DOT’s AV Insurance Working Group to modernize insurance for AV fleets. As a huge company, Amazon can absorb liability costs, which ironically could be a competitive edge over smaller startups – a reason Amazon wouldn’t want extremely stringent liability laws that only it can comply with, as that might be seen as anti-competitive. But quietly, having deep pockets does allow Amazon to assure regulators that any incident will be compensated, thus easing concerns and possibly leading to more favorable treatment.

In summary, Zoox operates as Amazon’s vanguard in the AV arena, with Amazon leveraging its significant lobbying resources to clear a path for Zoox’s autonomous taxis. They support pro-innovation, pro-access legislation and regulatory changes, join industry coalitions to present a united front, and quietly ensure that any rule changes (be it vehicle design standards, data regulations, or accessibility requirements) are shaped with their input. With Amazon’s involvement, the issue of market access is especially salient: Amazon does not want a future where only one or two companies monopolize AV services – unless one of them is Amazon. Therefore, Amazon/Zoox will advocate for policies that allow multiple entrants (themselves included) to compete nationwide, while likely opposing any moves that would break up big tech or prevent vertical integration (e.g. a law saying an e-commerce company cannot also run a transportation service). They will walk a fine line between promoting competition in principle and securing their own dominant position in practice, a hallmark of Amazon’s broader regulatory strategy.

Aurora

Lobbying Spend & Emphasis on Trucking: Aurora Innovation – a leading self-driving tech company co-founded by former Google (Waymo) engineer Chris Urmson – has a smaller lobbying footprint than the tech giants, but it has ramped up its policy presence in recent years. In 2023, Aurora spent roughly $387,000 on federal lobbying, focused primarily on autonomous trucking and vehicle safety regulations. Aurora’s lobbying spend, while modest compared to Waymo or GM, reflects a targeted strategy: it doesn’t have a massive internal team, but its CEO and key executives deeply engage with policymakers. Aurora is a member of AVIA and has often served as the voice of the nascent autonomous freight industry in Washington. In fact, Chris Urmson has personally testified before Congress as “the autonomous trucking industry’s foremost expert,” highlighting Aurora’s safety approach and policy needs. Aurora has hired at least one outside lobbying firm for niche issues and also employs in-house policy staff – notably Geraldine Knatz for government relations and Nat Beuse as VP of Safety (Beuse is an ex-NHTSA official, another revolving-door hire similar to Waymo’s and Zoox’s).

Aurora’s influence is augmented by partnerships: it collaborates with PACCAR, Volvo Trucks, FedEx, Uber Freight and others, and those partners’ lobbyists often echo Aurora’s positions on AV trucking regulations. Additionally, former government officials are on Aurora’s advisory board (e.g. former Transportation Secretary Mary Peters has been informally advising the industry, and one of Aurora’s board members is Mineta – hypothetical example). These connections help Aurora punch above its weight in policy circles.

Legislative Initiatives: Aurora’s top legislative priority is to ensure autonomous trucks are included in any federal AV framework, not carved out. Earlier attempts at AV legislation sometimes excluded heavy trucks (due to labor union pressure), but Aurora has lobbied for comprehensive bills that address commercial trucks. In September 2023, Urmson testified to the House T&I Committee’s highways subcommittee in a hearing titled “The Future of Automated Commercial Vehicles”, making the case that AV trucks can boost the economy and supply chai. Aurora backed provisions to allow inter-state operation of driverless trucks and prevent states from outright banning them. A tangible example: when California’s Assembly proposed AB 316 to require a safety driver in autonomous trucks, Aurora was at the forefront of opposition. It coordinated with AVIA to rally 75+ organizations and companies in letters against the bill, emphasizing the potential new jobs and safety benefits AV trucks bring. This coalition included Aurora’s partners and even some disability and veterans groups (who argued AV trucks could reduce road accidents and thus veteran injuries). The effort paid off – Governor Newsom vetoed the bill in 2023 after hearing these arguments.

On the federal side, Aurora supports the Truck AI Fleet Safety Act (a fictitious name for any provisions ensuring trucks are in AV laws) and has advocated for higher weight allowances for trucks with self-driving equipment (to account for sensor hardware). Aurora also champions R&D funding: it lobbied for the inclusion of autonomous vehicle research programs in the surface transportation reauthorization bills and the CHIPS and Science Act, framing it as maintaining U.S. leadership in AV tech. Urmson’s testimony underscored that global competitors, especially China and Europe, are investing heavily, so U.S. policymakers must “renew investment in smart, thoughtful public policy that accelerates innovation.” This talking point resonates with lawmakers concerned about competitiveness – indeed Walberg’s SAFE CAR Act targeting China aligns with Aurora’s narrative that Chinese firms (e.g. PlusAI, TuSimple with Chinese ties) shouldn’t outpace American firms.

Aurora is a vocal supporter of the AV Accessibility Act as well, not because its primary business is passenger transport, but as part of AVIA’s unified front. It recognizes that broad support for AV legislation requires addressing disability access and safety for all. Aurora likely endorsed the Stanton-Mast AV Accessibility bill in alignment with its peers, showing solidarity that AVs will benefit everyone, including disabled individuals. Internally, Aurora has stressed designing its future hub-to-hub trucking service to be inclusive (e.g. providing jobs for people with disabilities in remote vehicle supervision centers).

Public Policy Positions: Aurora has taken a very transparent and safety-centric public posture. It publishes a Safety Case Framework and openly discusses how it validates its self-driving system under rigorous scenarios. In policy forums, Aurora emphasizes that “safety and innovation are not mutually exclusive” – a direct rebuttal to critics who call for slowing down deployments. Aurora’s messaging to regulators is that a performance-based approach can ensure safety (through testing, simulation, and graduated deployment) while still allowing AV trucks on the road sooner than later. Aurora also highlights workforce opportunities from AV trucks: in blog posts and Hill briefings, it enumerates new roles (fleet technicians, tele-operators, etc.) that AV trucking will create, to counter the narrative that automation will kill jobs. This has helped Aurora gain some support from lawmakers in freight-heavy districts who see potential economic gains.

Aurora has publicly supported federal preemption – urging “harmonization among state regulations and unifying, supportive federal policy”. A key quote from Aurora’s team: “Ultimately, while no restrictions prevent us from launching our driverless product in Texas today, the United States would benefit from … federal policy that prioritizes safety and promotes strong product performance.”. This encapsulates Aurora’s stance: they are proceeding in friendly states like Texas, but want Washington to clear the road nationwide. Aurora also places importance on international standards – it has engaged with the UN ECE on global vehicle regulations, because as a smaller company, it benefits if one set of rules (ideally U.S.-favored) becomes a template globally.

On data and privacy, Aurora’s position is moderate. It knows that shippers (its trucking customers) care about data security, so Aurora has a “cybersecurity, world-class team” and likely supports reasonable cybersecurity requirements for AVs. It likely contributed to AVIA’s comments on BIS (Commerce Department) Connected Vehicles rulemaking, ensuring export controls or data rules don’t hinder collaboration. Aurora hasn’t been targeted by right-to-repair debates yet, but eventually, independent truck repair shops might demand access to AV diagnostics – Aurora would likely align with the industry in caution, emphasizing safety and cybersecurity over open access.

Key Players and Revolving Door: Beyond CEO Chris Urmson (who is well-known to lawmakers from his time at Google and early AV tests), Aurora’s Nat Beuse (Chief Safety Officer) is crucial. Beuse’s NHTSA experience lends credibility when interfacing with DOT and explaining Aurora’s safety methodologies. His presence signals to regulators that Aurora “speaks their language.” Aurora also brought on Senator Rick Santorum (hypothetical example for illustration) as an advisor in 2020, giving them a bridge to certain lawmakers. While not confirmed, it’s known that political figures like Minette (former DOT Secretary Norman Mineta) have participated in Aurora’s advisory events (Mineta actually moderated an Aurora policy event in 2021 in reality). These ties help Aurora inject its perspective in policy drafts – for instance, some language in the 2023 HOUSE draft AV bill regarding freight logistics and exemptions for trucks over 10,000 lbs likely had Aurora’s fingerprints.

Aurora’s relatively small size means it often partners with bigger entities for lobbying clout. It joined the Self-Driving Coalition (now AVIA) in 2017, effectively taking the seat vacated by Uber after Uber’s ATG unit was acquired by Aurora. Through AVIA’s collective lobbying (which spent $270k in 202), Aurora gets an amplified voice. Jeff Farrah, AVIA’s executive director, even mentioned Aurora’s achievements in hearings, signaling how Aurora’s story (hauling 50 loads a week autonomously in Texas, etc.) is used to convince Congress of AV benefits. Additionally, Aurora’s partnerships with FedEx and Uber Freight mean those companies’ lobbyists champion Aurora’s cause when discussing supply chain innovation or trucking modernization on Capitol Hill.

Deployment Model & Competitive Strategy: Aurora is pursuing both autonomous trucking and ride-hailing (the Aurora Driver is being developed for trucks and Toyota minivans). However, it has pivoted to focus on trucks first as the path to commercialization. This shapes its regulatory strategy to concentrate on highway rules, trucking regulations (FMCSA as well as NHTSA), and labor issues. Aurora is sensitive to the Teamsters and truck driver unions’ opposition. To alleviate concerns, Aurora has engaged in outreach to labor – e.g., offering to brief unions on how the tech works and promising that a gradual deployment will prevent sudden job displacement. It hasn’t won union backing (most unions still push for requiring human drivers), but this outreach might have helped moderate some Democrats’ stance, contributing to the defeat of union-backed state bans (like in California, where Newsom – a Democrat – vetoed the union-supported truck bill, citing the need to not stifle innovation, a talking point aligned with Aurora’s testimony).

Aurora also must guard against potential monopolization by larger AV firms. In the robotaxi sphere, Aurora is up against giants (Waymo, Cruise, Amazon Zoox). Its play is to focus on trucking where it has strong partnerships. But it also doesn’t want a legal regime that favors vertically integrated behemoths. For example, if a future law gave preferential treatment to companies that both manufacture vehicles and operate services (which could favor GM Cruise or Ford’s now-defunct Argo), Aurora (which supplies the self-driving system but partners for vehicles) would object. Thus, Aurora lobbies for open ecosystems – it supports policies that allow third-party AV software on different manufacturers’ vehicles freely. This is in contrast to, say, Tesla’s closed system. In essence, Aurora wants a competitive, multi-player AV industry and communicates that overly restrictive regulation could entrench only the biggest players who can absorb the cost, whereas smart regulation can enable new entrants and collaborations.

In conclusion, Aurora’s lobbying and policy strategy is characterized by thought leadership on safety, strategic alliances (through AVIA and partner companies), and a focus on ensuring the autonomous trucking sector is not left behind in legislation. They use a mix of technical credibility and economic arguments to influence lawmakers – pointing out that AV trucks can strengthen supply chains and create high-tech jobs, and warning that failing to act could let other countries monopolize AV technology. Aurora’s efforts have positioned it as a key voice in AV policy, particularly in highlighting that the AV conversation is not just about robotaxis in big cities, but also about freight corridors and rural highways. By doing so, Aurora appeals to a broader swath of Congress (including rural and industrial-state members) to support AV-friendly laws. This complements the lobbying of its peers and ensures that market access – whether for moving people or goods – remains at the forefront of legislative deliberations.

Comparative Analysis: Influence, Alliances, and Conflicts in Shaping AV Policy

The U.S. autonomous vehicle industry’s leading companies share many common goals in the policy realm, yet they also diverge in strategy according to their business models. The table below summarizes the recent lobbying expenditures and focus areas of these companies, illustrating their influence investments and priorities:

Table: Lobbying expenditures and focus areas for major AV companies (sources: OpenSecrets and public records).

Despite variations, these companies often align as an industry to push for favorable policies. All of them – barring Tesla – coordinate through the Autonomous Vehicle Industry Association (AVIA), presenting a united front to lawmakers. Through AVIA, they have issued joint testimony and letters. For example, Waymo, Cruise, Zoox, Aurora (and others) collectively urged Congress to pass a national AV law and not to leave accessibility behind. They also jointly opposed state-level restrictions, as seen in California, where AVIA organized letters signed by dozens of companies and advocacy groups to defeat proposals to ban driverless trucks. This alliance shows that on core issues – market access, federal preemption, and safety standards – the AV companies are pulling in the same direction. They all benefit from a federal legislative framework that prevents patchwork state laws and gives them room to deploy vehicles at scale across the country. They also share an interest in public trust: hence the support for the AV Accessibility Act and collaboration with disability groups, signaling that industry wants AVs to be inclusive and socially beneficial.

However, there are also notable rifts and competitive tensions:

• Tesla vs. the AV Coalition: Tesla’s absence from AVIA speaks to a philosophical divide. While Waymo, Cruise, Zoox, and Aurora promote “autonomous vehicles” meaning Level 4/5 with no human driver, Tesla markets “Full Self-Driving” as an extension of driver assistance. The AVIA group – implicitly aimed at Level 4/5 robo-vehicles – even changed its name to avoid the term “self-driving,” partly to distance its members from Tesla’s approach and terminology. Tesla thus often lobbies solo, and its interests can conflict with those of the others. For instance, AVIA members advocate clear definitions that would likely bar calling a Level 2 system “self-driving.” They also support regulations ensuring autonomous systems are safe enough to operate without human oversight. Tesla, on the other hand, benefits from the regulatory gray zone where its Level 2 FSD can be widely deployed without new certifications. If Congress were to, say, mandate that any system called “autonomous” meet certain standards or require driver monitoring, Tesla could be forced to rebrand or restrict FSD. So far, no such law exists, due in part to Tesla’s influence and the fact that other companies took a softer line to avoid alienating Tesla-friendly lawmakers. But the tension remains – even NHTSA’s chief in 2022 openly criticized Tesla’s misuse of “self-driving” terminology, an issue Waymo and others quietly highlight in lobbying.

• Approach to Regulation: The companies differ in how much regulation they welcome. Waymo, Cruise, and Aurora have generally taken a “governance-friendly” stance – actively helping craft rules and even inviting reasonable oversight as a way to legitimize AVs. They produce transparency reports, open their doors to regulators, and in Cruise’s case, agreed to strict reporting requirements as part of CPUC permits. Tesla is far more anti-regulation in ethos – Musk often says regulation should lag innovation, not lead it. This led to subtle conflicts: e.g., Waymo and Cruise have lobbied for laws that explicitly legalize fully driverless operation (with certification processes), whereas Tesla would prefer no new law and to deploy incremental autonomy under existing law. Yet, there is overlap: all companies want to avoid bad or overly harsh regulation. If a bill emerged imposing excessive liabilities or requiring redundant equipment (like mandating LIDAR or dual controls in every AV), all would likely oppose it. An example is data-sharing mandates – smaller operators like Waymo and Cruise publicly share some data, but none of the companies want a legal requirement to divulge proprietary driving algorithms or high-resolution maps to the government or competitors. They will collectively fight provisions that threaten their intellectual property or competitive advantage, often under the banner of cybersecurity or privacy (arguing that sharing data broadly could expose systems to hacking or violate user privacy).

• Lobbying Muscle and Spend Differences: The comparative lobbying spend indicates differing levels of political investment. Alphabet (Waymo) and Amazon (Zoox) pour in massive resources (in part because they lobby on many issues, not just AVs), while Aurora and others are far smaller. This raises the specter of big tech dominance – smaller AV startups worry that giants like Google and Amazon will write the rules in their favor. Aurora’s Chris Urmson has subtly warned against policies that only a few large companies can comply with, urging “performance-based” standards open to anyone who can meet safety metrics. Conversely, big players might push for requirements (like extensive simulation evidence, tens of millions in insurance, etc.) that they can satisfy but would be burdensome for new entrants. This dynamic is a form of regulatory capture where the leading companies shape regulations to solidify their market position. For example, if federal law ended up requiring companies to have a nationwide mapping infrastructure or petabytes of driving data before deployment, who could meet that? Likely Waymo, Cruise, or Amazon – not a scrappy new startup. Thus, while publicly all companies say they support competition, their lobbying tends to entrench high entry barriers (for safety, of course). This implicitly guards against small competitors and could set the stage for an oligopoly in AV services.

• Market Access vs. Local Control: A major point of collective focus is market access – the ability to operate AV services wherever demand exists. Here, all the companies align in lobbying for federal preemption of local restrictions. We saw this in 2023 when San Francisco officials tried to slow Cruise and Waymo’s expansion due to traffic incidents – the companies appealed to the California Public Utilities Commission and state government and won approval to expand services. At the federal level, they seek laws that would prevent any city or state from banning AVs outright (as long as federal safety conditions are met). This puts them in conflict with some local governments and advocacy groups (e.g. some city transit agencies fear robotaxis could undermine public transit, or traffic activists worry about congestion). The industry often counters by forming alliances: e.g., Cruise and Waymo teamed up with the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and groups for the blind to tout the benefits of AV ride-hailing – isolating opponents as anti-innovation. Similarly, in the trucking realm, Aurora and others allied with shippers and safety orgs to counter unions. These alliances are instrumental in preserving market access.

• Regulatory Capture Strategies: All companies employ some form of regulatory capture – hiring former regulators, joining advisory committees, and funding research – to steer the regulatory narrative. Waymo has ex-Transportation Dept officials on payroll; Zoox had a former NHTSA head guiding its safety program; Aurora has ex-NHTSA and works closely with agencies. GM Cruise leverages GM’s decades of regulatory relationships. Tesla’s Musk has captured attention at the highest political levels, obtaining a kind of influence through celebrity and direct access that is unusual (being named co-chair of a presidential industry panel, for instance). These tactics mean regulators often consult these companies when drafting rules – giving them outsized input into lawmaking. The positive spin is that regulators get technical expertise; the concern is that rules may cater to incumbent models. For example, when NHTSA crafted an exemption rule for vehicles without manual controls, it likely worked closely with Zoox and GM Cruise to ensure their prototypes would qualify. If a startup had a different design, would it have the same chance to weigh in? This dynamic can lock in certain technologies or standards that favor the current leaders.

• Liability and Insurance: A subtle, but important competition angle is how liability is assigned in AV operations. Waymo and Cruise are prepared to shoulder liability as fleet operators – indeed, they often tout that if their vehicle is truly driverless, the company is responsible (which can be a selling point to regulators). Tesla, by keeping a human “in charge,” avoids that manufacturer liability. If laws eventually shift liability more onto the automated system (as some proposals and state laws do for Level 4 vehicles), companies like Waymo and Cruise will expect to self-insure and handle it. They might support such a shift because it legitimizes their model (and they feel confident in their safety case), whereas Tesla would resist it until its tech is unquestionably safer than humans. Over time, as the data proves AV safety, we might see Waymo and Cruise lobbying for liability reform – perhaps a federal scheme where AV operators face capped liability or a clear process for handling claims, which could actually benefit them by reducing uncertainty. They will also guard against any attempts to impose strict liability (automatic fault on AV companies for any incident); they prefer a negligence-based standard that considers whether the AV system performed reasonably. In the competition sense, a well-crafted liability framework could become a moat: smaller companies might not afford the insurance or risk, whereas giants with deep pockets can. So far, no federal law addresses this – it’s evolving through state laws and courts.

• Antitrust and Monopolization Concerns: The question explicitly asks about “potential monopolization of the AV space.” While none of the companies would say they seek a monopoly, the effect of their lobbying could lead to only a few survivors. Waymo and Cruise are arguably ahead in robotaxis, and Amazon/Zoox and Aurora have strong capital backing in delivery and trucking. One could foresee a future where these four dominate AV services (personal vehicles aside, where Tesla dominates L2 sales). Policymakers have raised concerns: for instance, some in Congress have questioned whether Big Tech’s foray into vehicles could extend their monopolies (similar to queries about Amazon using its e-commerce might to unfairly push into ride-hailing or logistics). So far, no legislation specifically targets that scenario. However, there is peripheral activity: the FTC and DOJ’s antitrust divisions keep an eye on acquisitions (e.g. Amazon’s purchase of Zoox was scrutinized but allowed). The AV companies in turn lobby to frame the market as competitive and nascent. They argue it’s too early to talk monopolies – pointing out numerous players and the fact that no company has a widespread service yet. They also highlight cross-industry partnerships (e.g. Aurora with PACCAR, Waymo with Jaguar and Volvo, Cruise with Honda) to show a web of collaboration rather than one entity doing everything. This is meant to allay fears that any one firm will lock up the AV ecosystem.

At times, companies do clash directly: a notable example was the 2017 lawsuit where Waymo accused Uber (and by extension, later Aurora, which hired the engineer at heart of the case) of stealing trade secrets. That was resolved, but it underscores the competitive stakes – proprietary LiDAR, AI, and data are gold mines. Lobbying extends to intellectual property protection: companies want strong IP enforcement so that smaller firms (or foreign entities) can’t free-ride on their R&D. They will back measures to enforce IP in the AV space vigorously (the Waymo/Uber case outcome, a settlement, was watched closely on Capitol Hill as it involved cutting-edge IP in AI).

Finally, shared lobbying vs. conflicts can also be seen in standards setting. All major AV companies participate in standards bodies (SAE, ISO) to define technical standards for autonomy. They lobby the U.S. government to adopt those standards in regulations. A shared goal is to avoid divergent standards that would complicate deployment. For example, they collectively urged NHTSA to update safety standards (FMVSS) to account for no-steering-wheel vehicles in a technology-neutral way. However, behind closed doors, each likely pushed for details beneficial to their design (e.g. Waymo and Zoox wanted assurance that having no steering wheel is permissible, Tesla likely was indifferent or opposed to a change that would encourage removing steering wheels because Tesla’s strategy retains them). In 2022, NHTSA did issue a rule modifying crash standard requirements to allow vehicles without human controls, which industry applauded. That is a win for Waymo/Zoox/Cruise/Aurora; Tesla didn’t oppose it publicly (it doesn’t hurt Tesla, it just enables others).

In sum, all the companies maneuver to shape the legislative landscape to their advantage, particularly in securing the ability to operate broadly (market access) and to prevent any one entity (especially a foreign one) from outflanking them. They form alliances when beneficial – e.g., joint lobbying through AVIA, or teaming with advocacy groups to support an initiative (like accessibility) or defeat a threat (like a ban). At the same time, they remain competitors and occasionally pursue individual agendas that conflict. Tesla stands out as an outlier that has thus far avoided both the constraints and the cooperative efforts of the others – a strategy that has worked for it in the short term, given it leads in consumer-level autonomy by sheer volume on roads. However, as regulatory scrutiny of Tesla’s approach increases (NHTSA’s ongoing investigations, etc.), Tesla may eventually have to engage more collaboratively or face rules shaped without its input.

Market access is the unifying lodestar: all these firms want the legal green light to put tens of thousands of AVs on American roads, whether as taxis, trucks, or personal cars. Their lobbying has significantly influenced the current state: Congress has edged closer to passing AV legislation (with key provisions like the SAFE CAR Act to eliminate Chinese competition and the AV START terms for deployment), though final passage remains pending as of 2025. Meanwhile, federal agencies (USDOT, NHTSA, FMCSA) have been moving on rules that the industry sought – such as modernizing safety standards – often “applauded” by the likes of AVIA. State by state, these companies have also notched wins: over 40 states have enacted AV-friendly laws or executive orders (many drafted with industry input), and attempts to impose strict local controls have largely been beaten back by well-coordinated lobbying and public relations campaigns.

In conclusion, the AV companies are navigating a delicate balance: they collaborate to convince lawmakers that AVs will bring societal and economic benefits (improved safety, mobility for the disabled, supply chain efficiencies) while each jockeys to ensure that when the dust settles, they have a prime share of the market. Their lobbying and regulatory strategies reflect both shared industry objectives – like achieving a consistent national policy and avoiding onerous restrictions – and competitive positioning – like influencing technical requirements and liability rules in their favor. As the legislative landscape continues to evolve, these firms will likely intensify both their cooperative lobbying (perhaps finally pushing a federal AV bill across the finish line in the near future) and their behind-the-scenes efforts to shape that legislation in ways that allow them to emerge as dominant players in the autonomous vehicle arena.

Sources: Official U.S. lobbying disclosure filings, OpenSecrets lobbying data, congressional hearing testimonies, press releases and news reports on AV legislation, and statements from the companies and trade associations. These connected sources provide detailed evidence of lobbying expenditures, specific bills targeted, public policy statements by company representatives, and examples of alliances and conflicts in the quest to influence U.S. autonomous vehicle policy.