No representation without reservation; Gender quotas in India

Across the developing world, but especially in rural areas, women lag behind men in key development outcomes. A growing body of research links these gaps to unequal political representation, with men dominating positions of governance (Beaman et al. 2009, Bhalotra et al. 2023, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Iyer et al. 2012). Increasing female representation improves women’s outcomes through two main channels: women leaders tend to prioritise different policies, and exposure to female leaders changes domestic attitudes towards women (Beaman et al. 2009). Beyond these instrumental concerns, the underrepresentation of women in democratic institutions raises important normative questions. In response, over 100 countries have adopted gender quotas to improve both equity and outcomes.

Gender quotas are thought to redress political imbalances by increasing both demand and supply. Quotas increase demand by reducing statistical discrimination: as voters and elites observe women in leadership roles, they update beliefs about competence. Over time, such exposure is expected to erode stereotypes and improve the viability of female candidates (Bhavnani 2009). In effect, this creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, where female representation becomes a cause and consequence for electing women. Quotas may also directly increase the supply of women by bringing into politics women who may not have otherwise run (O’Connell 2020).

These mechanisms imply that quotas should generate durable gains in representation even after they are lifted, as shifts in beliefs and participation sustain women’s political presence. However, there are reasons to doubt this optimistic trajectory. Voters may not update their beliefs if elected female leaders are perceived as ineffective, especially if they serve as figureheads or face binding structural constraints (Heinze et al. 2025). If women in office promote policies that align with women’s preferences but are not in sync with broader voter priorities, it may also weaken their electoral support. In such cases, rather than setting in motion a self-sustaining cycle of representation, quotas may fail to translate into long-term political gains for women.

Studying the impact of 15 years of electoral gender quotas

In Karekurve-Ramachandra and Sood (2024), we analyse the effect of quotas for women in local government in rural India, one of the largest and longest-running natural experiments in quota policies. Specifically, we analyse non-partisan rural elections in more than 14,000-gram panchayats (GP, a collection of villages forming the governance unit) in Rajasthan across four cycles: 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. In Rajasthan, a third of the leadership positions (half in 2020) in GPs are randomly set aside for women in each election cycle (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Nilekani 2010, Brulé et al. 2023). The random assignment allows us to study the effect of reserving the leadership position for women on the probability of women winning the GP in a subsequent election when the seat is open. This mimics the temporary withdrawal of quotas from the seat while the overall policy remains in effect. As a robustness check, we analyse similar elections in more than 20,000 GPs in Uttar Pradesh, where a third of seats were reserved for women in the 2005, 2010, and 2015 cycles.

Without quotas, women’s political representation is hindered

With the exception of modest effects in 2010, when quotas implemented in 2005 plausibly slightly increased women’s chances of winning in open seats, we find no evidence of quotas increasing women’s chances of getting elected in an open seat in the next cycle. Our standard errors are small enough that changes upwards of 5 percentage points are highly unlikely. We also find no evidence for more women fighting elections. In contrast to more optimistic findings from urban settings—a 17.9 percentage point change across 120 wards in Mumbai (Bhavnani 2009)—our results suggest that gender quotas do not lead to large gains in women’s representation once they are lifted. To better understand these patterns, we examine three potential mechanisms.

First, we called 500 randomly sampled representatives in gender-reserved seats on their official phone numbers. About 88% of the calls were answered by someone other than the representative, typically a male relative such as a husband, father, or son. When we requested to speak to the representative, most of the interlocutors refused without giving a reason. In contrast, when we called representatives from non-reserved (open) seats, around 80% of the mostly male incumbents answered directly. These patterns suggest that while gender quotas ensure women hold office formally, men often continue to exercise control. Therefore, gender quotas may not be creating conditions for women to be in power after the quotas are lifted.

Second, we find that both elected leaders and political candidates in quota seats tend to be considerably less professionalised, less educated, and younger than their counterparts in open seats. These differences in experience and qualifications may limit the ability of quota-elected leaders to shift public attitudes toward women in politics (Atkeson 2003).

Finally, while a key rationale for gender quotas is that exposure to women in positions of power can change public attitudes, prior work typically examines relatively short windows, often just a single electoral cycle. But shifts in norms and beliefs often require longer exposure to generate meaningful change. To address this, we study whether prolonged exposure to quotas influences women’s electoral success in open seats. Specifically, we examine whether a woman was elected in 2020 in an open seat in Rajasthan, based on whether that seat had been reserved in any of the three prior election cycles (since 2005). Despite this extended 15-year window, we find no evidence that longer exposure to female leaders increases the likelihood that women run for or win office once reservations are lifted.

Implications for electoral gender quota policies

Women’s quota policies were introduced to address persistent gaps in both development and political representation. Initially applied to local governance, similar provisions are now embedded in the Indian Constitution for implementation at the state and national levels. While these policies ensure that women hold office, our findings suggest they often fail to translate into real political power. They also appear to have a limited lasting impact once quotas are lifted. The transformative potential of quotas has yet to materialise, and longer or more sustained exposure may be necessary to shift entrenched norms. After all, the social and institutional barriers these policies seek to overcome have developed over generations.

References

Atkeson, L R (2003), “Not all cues are created equal: The conditional impact of female candidates on political engagement,” The Journal of Politics, 65(4): 1040–1061.

Beaman, L, R Chattopadhyay, E Duflo, R Pande, and P Topalova (2009), “Powerful women: Does exposure reduce bias?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4): 1497–1540.

Bhalotra, S, D Clarke, J F Gomes, and A Venkataramani (2023), “Maternal mortality and women's political power,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 21(5): 2172–2208.

Bhavnani, R R (2009), “Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural experiment in India,” American Political Science Review, 103(1): 23–35.

Brulé, R, S Chauchard, and A R Heinze (2023), “Who actually governs? Gender inequality and political representation in rural India,” Unpublished manuscript.

Chattopadhyay, R and E Duflo (2004), “Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India,” Econometrica, 72(5): 1409–1443.

Heinze, A R, R E Brulé, and S Chauchard (2025), “Who actually governs? Gender inequality and political representation in rural India,” The Journal of Politics, 87(2): 818–822.

Iyer, L, A Mani, P Mishra, and P Topalova (2012), “The power of political voice: Women’s political representation and crime in India,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(4): 165–193.

Karekurve-Ramachandra, V and G Sood (2024), “The limits of electoral gender quotas in rural local bodies,” Unpublished manuscript.

Nilekani, J (2010), “Reservation for women in Karnataka gram panchayats: The implications of non-random reservation and the effect of women leaders,” Unpublished manuscript.

O'Connell, S D (2020), “Can quotas increase the supply of candidates for higher-level positions? Evidence from local government in India,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(1): 65–78.