45 Pages Posted: 23 May 2023 Last revised: 15 Jul 2025
See all articles by Winston Wei Dou
Winston Wei Dou
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Itay Goldstein
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department ; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Yan Ji
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Finance
There are 2 versions of this paper
Date Written: April 15, 2025
Abstract
The integration of algorithmic trading with reinforcement learning, termed AI-powered trading, is transforming financial markets. Alongside the benefits, it raises concerns for collusion. This study first develops a model to explore the possibility of collusion among informed speculators in a theoretical environment. We then conduct simulation experiments, replacing the speculators in the model with informed AI speculators who trade based on reinforcement-learning algorithms. We show that they autonomously sustain collusive supra-competitive profits without agreement, communication, or intent. Such collusion undermines competition and market efficiency. We demonstrate that two separate mechanisms are underlying this collusion and characterize when each one arises.
Keywords: Reinforcement learning, AI collusion, Competition and market efficiency, Experience-based and self-confirming equilibrium, Information asymmetry and price informativeness, Market liquidity
JEL Classification: D43, G10, G14, L13.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Dou, Winston Wei and Goldstein, Itay and Ji, Yan, AI-Powered Trading, Algorithmic Collusion, and Price Efficiency (April 15, 2025). Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper , The Wharton School Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4452704 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4452704
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