The problem with 'stabilising' China relations: it hardly makes a difference

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s current, six-day visit to China is meant to be another step in stabilising the relationship between the two countries. The problem is that no such efforts, by Australia and others, have made much difference to China’s behaviour.

A day after meeting President Xi Jinping, the prime minister recalled a bit of history, saying he was ‘following in the footsteps of the Labor prime minister Gough Whitlam, who was the first prime minister to visit here in 1973,’ adding that Whitlam had made the ‘correct decision’ and a ‘controversial decision’. Albanese is clearly trying to make a case that, though most of the Australian strategic community sees great risk in excessive trade and economic dependency on China, our national interest calls for the two countries to positively engage each other.

The visit is part of a policy that the government implemented on taking office in 2022, one of seeking stabilisation in relations, and, on the face of it, doing so must be a good thing.

Many countries have similarly reached out to Xi in the past few years, including Japan, India and the United States under the Biden administration. They have hoped to enhance stability and predictability in their bilateral relationships and in China’s behaviour in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, Indian foreign minister S Jaishankar is just concluding a visit to Beijing, where he met Xi, and there is talk that Prime Minister Narendra Modi may visit this year.

But such outreach has not worked. There has been little appreciable difference in China’s behaviour—a little improvement in trade access here and there, but no let-up in Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea and intimidation of Taiwan. In February, China rewarded three years of Australian efforts at stabilisation by sending a flotilla of warships to circumnavigate the continent, sending the message that it could reach us if it wanted to—and underlined the point by ordering them to conduct a live-fire exercise that unnecessarily disrupted air traffic.

Countries make concessions to China in the hope that it will see how accommodating they are. But it appears to see only weakness.

The prime minister’s careful statements in relation to egregious Chinese behaviour probably have a similar effect. For instance, on China’s circumnavigation and live-fire drill, Albanese on 15 July quoted Xi’s comment in their discussions: ‘Xi said that China engaged in exercises just as Australia engages in exercises.’ And he said he had told Xi that what China had done had been ‘within international law, there was no breach of international law by China, but that we were concerned about the notice and the way that it happened, including the live-fire exercises.’ This is all true, but it amounts to Australia pretending that there had been no attempt at intimidation.

It doesn’t help that the discussion between the prime minister and president lacked any real reference to security issues—at a time when these matters are becoming ever more prominent. Second, there was no mention of keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, a key Australian objective. Instead, the Chinese president referred to ‘a commitment to equal treatment, to seeking common ground while sharing differences, pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation [serving] the fundamental interests of our two countries and two peoples.’ It remains to be seen what the common ground between Australia and China is and what ‘sharing differences’ implies.

The prime minister side-stepped questions about this issue, saying only that he had ‘put forward Australia’s position … which is that we want peace and security in the region, that that is in the interest of both Australia and in the interest of China.’

Australia could have used these talks to press Beijing on security issues, especially transparency in military affairs. Trade and economic ties with China are important, but improving them does not change the basic conflict in relations with Beijing.

Australia and others ignored this for decades, hoping that deeper economic ties would bring warmer political relations, but to no avail. If anything, deeper economic engagement may deepen Australian dependency and vulnerability.

Trying to stabilise relations is worthwhile, especially with a power as important as China. But it can raise risks. And maybe it brings hardly any benefit.

Australia might change its behaviour and compromise its principles while China does not change at all.