UK CMA designates Google and Apple, proposes measures

3 months ago 2

CMA designates Google and Apple, proposes measures

Thursday 24 July 2025

Yesterday (23 July 2025), the UK’s monopoly regulator, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), announced that it was proposing to designate Apple and Google as having “Strategic Market Status” (SMS) as they hold an “effective duopoly” over the UK mobile ecosystem. It published proposed roadmaps of changes required to the way they operate to “promote competition in digital markets while protecting UK consumers and businesses from unfair or harmful practices”.

This comes after investigations stemming back four years, a halt caused by Apple arguing procedural nonsense, and an Act of Parliament (the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024) to give powers to investigate and impose sanctions.

The CMA notes the importance of Smartphone Apps to the UK economy, which is

Europe’s largest app economy by revenue and app developer count. In total, the UK app economy generates an estimated 1.5% of the UK’s GDP and supports around 400,000 jobs here.

Because there is a duopoly, the CMA proposes “roadmaps” for the companies to make changes, in order to:

Ensure a fair and transparent app review process and app store rankings
Allow the ability for developers to ‘steer’ users out of app stores, for example to make purchases.
Ensure UK app developers have interoperable access to key Apple functionality
Address Apple restrictions on digital wallets, and enabling connected devices like smartwatches and gaming headsets to seamlessly connect with smartphones
Ensure consumers have a genuine choice over the services they use on their devices
Leverage blue-sky synergies with “A.I.” magical sparkledust (I’m not interested in this one – can you tell?)

There were two parallel investigations – one into Apple’s mobile platform, the other into Google’s mobile ecosystem.

Both investigations treated “mobile platform” as a combination of

Mobile Operating System – so i[Pad]OS or Android
Native App Distribution, both the pre-installation of first party apps on mobile devices; and the installation, distribution and operation of third-party native apps through the the vendors’ App/ Play Stores
Mobile Browser and Browser Engines

Each proposed decision notes the colossal revenue share agreement between Apple and Google, whereby Google pays Apple 36% of the advertising revenue it makes from Google Search being the default in Apple’s Safari web browser. This discourages competition between the two duopolists. From the Apple decision ^[PDF], paragraph 6.2:

We also find that revenue sharing agreements between Apple and Google limit their incentive to compete for users. Considered in the round, we find that these factors result in limited competition between Apple’s and Google’s Mobile Platforms. In line with this, when considering evidence on outcomes, we observe limited competition on price and quality between the two.

However, neither of the proposed roadmaps prioritise ending the revenue share agreement – probably because that’s between their HQs which are outside UK, and are anyway has been found to be illegal in court in Trumpistan.

Apple’s part in duopoly

The CMA notes the Apple Browser Ban. Paragraph 1.11.(f) of the proposed Apple decision says

Apple requires all browsers that wish to operate on iOS and iPadOS to use its browser engine WebKit, again limiting the features and functionality third-party browsers can offer. It is particularly important that this restriction does not hold back innovation in mobile browsing

and paragraph 1.25 notes that Apple has long self-preferenced its own Safari:

In mobile browsers, Apple’s Safari also faces limited competitive constraints within Apple’s Mobile Ecosystem. Although other mobile browsers are available – in March 2025, Safari had a web traffic share of supply of 86% on Apple’s Mobile Ecosystem in the UK. The ability of other mobile browsers to provide a competitive constraint is limited by several barriers to entry and expansion, in particular the requirement to use Apple’s WebKit browser engine, as well as Safari’s superior access to functionality, and choice architecture.

In its proposed Apple roadmap ^[PDF], paragraph 1.13 states

Our immediate focus in this area will be on considering improvements to the process by which app developers can request interoperable access to key functionality within Apple’s mobile operating systems (Category 1). Whilst the aim would not be to create a default interoperability requirement, it would aim to ensure that Apple’s decisions in respect of interoperability requests are fair, transparent and objective

(Quite why the CMA does not aim to create a default interoperability requirement is beyond my small brain to fathom. I’ll be raising it in my response to the consultation.)

Other top priorities (from Autumn 2025) relate to fairness in AppStore reviews, rankings, data collection, allowing developers to steer users out of the AppStore, as well as fair interoperability request processes.

Priority 2 (for consultation in 2026) are interoperability for digital wallets and connected devices, and (of most interest to me) choice architecture, browsers and PWAs. Paragraphs 1.17-1.18 say

We are therefore prioritising the requirement to use Apple’s WebKit browser engine on iOS and iPadOS (the WebKit restriction) and allowing alternative browser engines onto iOS and iPadOS, whilst ensuring that these alternatives able to function effectively.

Finally, we are intending to prioritise furthering our understanding of progressive web apps (PWAs) and their potential competitive impact, including through additional stakeholder engagement, with a view to considering if measures are needed to enable their development.

Quite why PWAs require “additional stakeholder engagement” is a mystery; in previous reports, the CMA have been quite supportive. Regular readers will know me as a sunny, optimistic chap, so let’s hope Apple will have a change of heart (eg, leadership) and properly allow alternative browser engines to access iOS, thus PWAs will Just Work™ and no furher action will be required.

Areas where CMA is “still considering prioritisation, subject to international developments”:

• Requiring Apple to allow alternative app stores in iOS and iPadOS.
• Requiring Apple to allow users to download apps directly from the app developer’s own website (‘sideloading’).
• Requiring Apple to allow alternative payment methods for in-app purchases beyond Apple’s own in-app payment system.
• Action to address the impact on competition arising from the revenue share agreement between Apple and Google.

Google

Google isn’t incentivised to compete against Apple. Android dominates the low-end of the market, Apple the high-end. Paragraphs 6.65 – 6.66 of the proposed Google Decision ^[PDF] note:

if an Android end-user using Google Search switches to an Apple mobile device, Google is likely to retain that user as a user of Google Search. Therefore, the financial consequence on Google of losing a user from its Mobile Ecosystem are diminished compared to a situation in which the revenue sharing provisions are not in place.

In addition to the reduced incentive to compete for users with Apple at the margin, we consider that Google has a wider incentive not to disrupt its relationship with Apple by competing with it head-on.

The Google decision notes the importance of being the default search engine in paragraphs 6.61 – 6.62:

Being the preset default general search engine is valuable because end-users rarely change the preset default.

The level of revenue share paid to Apple – and hence the revenue retained by Google – does not differ significantly depending on whether Apple’s Safari or Google’s Chrome browser is used.

Google cements its default search dominance on iOS by bunging Apple $20 Billion each year. For handset manufacturers other than Apple, there are very few OS options available to handset manufacturers (Google decision, 6.10):

Google faces extremely limited constraint from the threat of OEMs switching to license a different Mobile Platform. This results in Google having substantial market power in its negotiations with OEMs, allowing it to control the use of its Mobile Platform and the placement and promotion of its broader services.

On Android, Google cements its search default via contracts with handset manufacturers who wish to license Android. Annex C of the Google decision (Appendix C: Overview of Google’s agreements with OEMs and MNOs ^[PDF]) deals with the contractual landscape in UK, which is complex (and heavily redacted). Paragraph C.54 summarises it:

the agreements between Google and Android OEMs create substantial financial incentives for OEMs to promote Google’s apps and services on their mobile devices

As paragraph 4.56 of the proposed Google decision states,

The operating system is pre-installed software which powers Android mobile devices. As noted above, a large majority of apps in the UK are downloaded on Android from the Play Store. Google’s agreements with OEMs also contain provisions financially incentivising pre-installation and prominent placement of Chrome, which runs on Blink, and Chrome is pre-installed on the majority of Android devices in the UK

The proposed Google roadmap prioritises Play Store fairness (transparent ranking, reviews, not unfairly using data).

Its priority 2 list (for consultation or investigation from 2026) has Choice architecture, further work to explore the potential for Progressive Web Apps, and allowing developers to direct their potential customers off the Play Store.

On Choice Architecture, the proposed decision notes (para 1.13):

Our other key concern is in relation to the agreements Google has with mobile device manufacturers and, combined with Google’s control over the Android operating system, the significant influence that these have on the content and services users access on an Android mobile device. We are therefore planning to focus on choice architecture to try and ensure users make an active choice as to their content or service provider, and in turn enable third-party app developers to compete on more of a level playing field with Google’s own services.

Perhaps this helps explain why in the EU, Google is playing even more hardball than Apple about relinquishing the hotseat if a non-Chrome browser is set as default.

Interestingly, paragraph 1.11 of the Google roadmap notes Judge Gonzalez Rogers order for Apple to stop imposing its commissions on purchases made for iPhone apps through web links inside an app:

While the design of any potential steering intervention will need careful consideration, one form of this intervention implemented by Apple in the US appears to be delivering positive benefits. In a matter of weeks, it resulted in changes such as app developers rolling out new and improved products, and announced price decreases for affected users.

So what now?

The proposed designation of Apple and Google, and the proposed roadmaps, are open for consultation. SPEKE YR BRANE about Google or SUMMON THE VENGEFUL SPIRIT OF STEVE about Apple before the end of 20 August.

Assuming that the army of Apple lawyers don’t sue in every UK court over the non-circular shape of one of bullet point glyphs, then the top-priority ~~Marxist assaults on capitalism, enterprise and innovation~~ measures in the roadmap will go for investigation or consultation towards the end of this year.

For your truly, it’s been 4 years of presenting to the regulators, visiting them, answering questions with dire legal warnings ringing in our ears, and countering the blahblah from shiny-suited corporate lobbyists to persuade the CMA to decide that Google and Apple are a duopoly, or parallel monopolies. (And I’m lucky – for the last year, it’s been part of my paid job with Vivaldi browser. My ertswhile colleagues at Open Web Advocacy do it for love of the web.)

Now we need to persuade CMA to do something effective about it, and quickly. Delay just allows monopolists to accumulate even more billions of pounds in rent from developers, businesses, and customers.