Why the Dalai Lama's succession matters for Trump's China policy

The Dalai Lama’s recent announcement that his succession will be determined by his non-profit organisation, the Gaden Phodrang Trust, has thrust Tibet back into the international spotlight. By ruling out China’s involvement in the centuries-old reincarnation process, the Dalai Lama is rebuking the Chinese Communist Party’s claim that it alone has the authority to approve reincarnations of Tibetan lamas. The remarks have provoked a strong reaction from Beijing – which has claimed control of Tibet since 1950 – with China outright rejecting the succession plan, insisting instead that the successor be selected in accordance with tradition and Chinese law.

So, what’s this got to do with Washington?

Whenever Washington has tried to pursue positive relations with China, it has brushed the Tibet issue aside.

Since the United States first made contact with Tibet in 1942, US policy has operated on two levels. On one hand, Washington maintains that Tibet is part of the People’s Republic of China, as acknowledged in the Tibetan Policy Act (TPA) of 2002. On the other, Washington has demonstrated relatively high levels of support for human rights and religious freedom in Tibet, including political and financial support. The history of US policy towards Tibet reflects how Washington’s views and prioritisation of Tibet have fluctuated, which some have described as “opportunistic”.

Indeed, whenever Washington has tried to pursue positive relations with China, it has brushed the Tibet issue aside. This was evident during the US–China rapprochement in the early 1970s, when Tibet was relegated in Washington’s foreign policy priorities. In fact, when the Dalai Lama wanted to visit the United States in 1970, Henry Kissinger, the national security adviser to president Richard Nixon, opposed the trip on grounds that it would draw attention to the “Tibetan cause” and “create, gratuitously and without a compensating gain, a further point of friction between us [the United States] and Communist China”.

Since the passing of the TPA, successive US governments have maintained a consistent position of calling for dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama, while providing financial support to Tibetans in South Asia to preserve their unique identity. After George W. Bush’s presidency, a pattern has been established wherein US presidents periodically met the Dalai Lama, albeit in his capacity as a “respected religious and cultural figure” rather than as head of state. While care has been taken to ensure the visits did not derail efforts to improve ties with China, particularly during the Obama administration, the meetings sent a strong message that Washington was committed to preserving human rights and religious freedom globally.

During his first term as US president, Donald Trump did not meet the Dalai Lama. Until the appointment of Robert Destro in 2020, the position of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues remained unfilled for three years. Some saw this appointment, coming at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China, as tokenism. Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, also did not meet the Dalai Lama, despite promising to do so during his election campaign.

At the congressional level, the Tibet issue has enjoyed bipartisan support, evident in the multiple legislations governing US ties with Tibet. Notably, under Trump’s first administration, the United States passed the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2019 (TSPA), which affirms that the succession of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including the Dalai Lama, should be determined solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community, free from interference by the Chinese government. It also authorises sanctions against Chinese officials who attempt to interfere in this process. Again in 2024, Congress passed the Resolve Tibet Act, subsequently signed into law by President Biden, which officially recognises that the CCP’s claim to Tibetan territory as “part of China since ancient times” is “historically inaccurate”. This reflects that at least at the legislative level there have been ongoing conversations about how the United States can best support Tibet and the Tibetan people.

Trump has shown his willingness to limit or even reverse measures advocated by the foreign policy establishment to pursue his goals..

Initial moves by the current Trump administration, such as freezing aid for Tibetans in exile, have signalled a lack of intent to strengthen ties with Tibetan leadership. While the aid decision has since been reversed, given President Trump’s reluctance to centre human rights issues as a component of US–China relations, there is a distinct possibility that Tibetan issues will be of peripheral concern.

Trump’s transactional – and often erratic – foreign policy moves mean Tibet may be used as a bargaining chip during ongoing trade negotiations with China. In the past, President Trump has shown his willingness to limit or even reverse measures advocated by the foreign policy establishment to pursue his goals. That Trump will revise, or simply disregard, the TSPA remains a distinct possibility. However, if Beijing refuses to engage with Washington and instead tries to isolate the United States globally, Trump may pursue an overtly aggressive approach by directly challenging the Chinese narrative on Tibet.

For now, it seems the administration has taken a “wait and watch” approach to the Dalai Lama’s succession. Given that Beijing is unlikely to show restraint and possibly use intimidation to get its way, a neutral US policy is tantamount to acquiescence. Beijing’s current rhetoric seems to be dictating how the United States should deal with the Dalai Lama and challenges the moral standing of Washington’s historic position. Will Trump derail ongoing trade negotiations with Beijing over the Tibet issue? Seems unlikely, but only time will tell.